The U.S. Treasury Department closed out June with one of its busiest sanctions weeks of the year, headlined by a sweeping strike against the Southeast Asian cyber-scam syndicate known as the Prince Group. Between June 23 and June 29, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued designations spanning four continents, targeting fraud networks preying on Americans, Cuba’s military-controlled banking system, war profiteers fueling Sudan’s civil war, and gold-laundering operations tied to a Rwandan-backed militia in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Commerce Department and the White House added export-enforcement and tariff actions of their own.
Taken together, the week’s measures illustrate the breadth of the economic-statecraft toolkit now in use, from transnational-criminal-organization authorities to country-specific embargo programs. The following digest summarizes eight of the most consequential actions, each sourced to public government records. Designations described below are administrative determinations by OFAC and other agencies; they are not criminal convictions, and named parties retain the right to petition for removal.
1. Treasury dismantles the Prince Group scam empire
The week’s marquee action came on June 23, when OFAC sanctioned nine individuals and 26 entities linked to the Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization (Prince Group TCO), an enterprise Treasury says is built on forced-labor “scam compounds” in Cambodia that defraud victims worldwide. According to Treasury’s press release, the action targets TCO leadership, investors in scam compounds, and front companies, and was paired with a Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposal to extend its October 2025 Huione Group rule to cover a successor payment entity, H-Pay Service PLC. The FBI’s New York office separately seized infrastructure tied to the Huione network, with coordination from Australian and Japanese authorities.
“Scam centers in Southeast Asia steal billions of dollars from American victims each year,” Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said in the announcement. Treasury cited a U.S. government estimate that Americans lost at least $10 billion in 2024 to Southeast Asia-based scams, a 66 percent increase over the prior year, much of it through “pig butchering” digital-asset investment fraud. The designations were issued under Executive Order 13581, as amended, and in furtherance of E.O. 14390, a March 2026 order on combating cyber-enabled fraud against Americans.
The newly designated network reaches well beyond Cambodia. OFAC named Hu Xiaowei — described in the release as the group’s “second-in-command” and previously listed in October 2025 under the alias Chen Xiao’er — along with a web of holding companies in the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore. It also designated Chen Bo, identified as the majority owner of Cambodia’s CCU Commercial Bank Plc, and Kong Ka On, who Treasury says controls eleven United Kingdom-registered companies ranging from restaurants to a telecommunications firm. The inclusion of a licensed Cambodian bank and a cluster of British shell companies signals that enforcement is moving up the financial-facilitation chain, not merely targeting compound operators. To limit collateral disruption, OFAC simultaneously issued TCO General License 2 authorizing a wind-down of transactions involving CCU Commercial Bank.
2. Cuba’s military-linked banks and conglomerates hit
In the same June 23 tranche, OFAC designated a cluster of Cuban state enterprises under the Cuba sanctions program established by Executive Order 14404. The targets, detailed in a State Department fact sheet, include Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI), one of the island’s principal hard-currency banks; Almacenes Universales S.A., a cargo-handling firm tied to the military conglomerate GAESA; the steelmaker Empresa Siderúrgica José Martí (Antillana de Acero); the salt and mining company Geominera S.A.; and the consultancy RAFIN S.A. OFAC also listed an individual, Annalie Lilliam Rueda Cardero, whom it links to Alejandro Castro Espín.
The action tightens pressure on the revenue architecture of the Cuban state, which Washington has long argued is dominated by the armed forces. By naming a major commercial bank with an international SWIFT presence, OFAC raises the compliance stakes for any foreign financial institution still processing Cuban transactions, since dealings with a blocked bank can expose third parties to secondary consequences. Financial institutions and trade counterparties with residual Cuba exposure should treat the BFI listing as a prompt to re-screen correspondent relationships.
3. Sanctions on the networks fueling Sudan’s war
On June 26, OFAC imposed sanctions on eight individuals and entities that Treasury says supply and finance both sides of Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Treasury’s press release describes procurement and recruitment networks operating from Sudan, India, and Panama. Among the named entities is SBL Energy Limited, an India-based explosives manufacturer, alongside Sudan’s Target Multiactivities Company and the Port Sudan-based Ports Engineering Company. A Panama-registered firm, Talent Bridge S.A., and three associated individuals were listed in connection with foreign-fighter recruitment.
“The Trump Administration is committed to advancing a lasting peace in Sudan and bringing an end to the conflict,” Bessent said, adding that “the networks profiting from the conflict in Sudan jeopardize the prospects for the humanitarian truce that the Sudanese people desperately need.” The statement renewed a U.S. call for an immediate, unconditional three-month humanitarian truce and urged external actors to halt financial and military support to the warring parties. The action was taken under Executive Order 14098, the Sudan-specific authority.
The designation of an Indian commercial explosives supplier is notable: it extends the war’s sanctions perimeter into the global commercial-chemicals trade and puts manufacturers and freight forwarders on notice that dual-use shipments destined for Sudanese end users carry heightened diligence obligations. The listings reflect Treasury’s assessment of the parties’ conduct; they are administrative findings rather than judicial determinations.
4. Rwandan-linked gold refiners tied to M23
On June 25, OFAC designated several Rwanda-based mining and refining companies under the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions program. The lead target, Gasabo Gold Refinery Ltd of Kigali, is identified as linked to M23, the armed group whose offensives in eastern DRC have drawn repeated U.S. condemnation. OFAC also named the businessman Jean Malic Kalima Karekezi and an associate, Bosco Kayobotsi, together with Bugambira Mines Ltd, Rwinkwavu Mining Corporation, and Wolfram Mining and Processing Ltd.
The action targets the monetization layer of the conflict — the refining and export of gold and other minerals that can convert battlefield control into hard currency. For downstream refiners, jewelers, and electronics manufacturers, the listings reinforce the reputational and legal risk of opaque Central African gold supply chains and the importance of upstream due diligence consistent with responsible-sourcing frameworks.
5. Russia: a Lukoil divestment license and continued delistings
Alongside the DRC action, OFAC issued Russia-related General License 131G, authorizing certain transactions to negotiate and enter into contingent contracts for the sale of Lukoil International GmbH, the Austrian-headquartered international arm of the sanctioned Russian energy major, along with related maintenance activities. OFAC updated two associated frequently asked questions. The license does not lift sanctions on Lukoil; rather, it creates a regulated pathway for a potential divestiture, an approach that lets Washington manage energy-market disruption while keeping the underlying restrictions intact.
The week also saw a steady stream of Russia-related delistings across June 23, 24, and 29, including the removal of names previously tied to the Serniya Engineering procurement network. Delistings of this kind typically follow petitions demonstrating a change in circumstances; they underscore that the sanctions list is dynamic, not static, and that removal is an available remedy.
6. Commerce’s $36 million Bosch export-control settlement
On the export-control side, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) earlier in the month announced a settlement with Germany’s Robert Bosch GmbH to resolve alleged violations of the Export Administration Regulations. According to BIS, between September 2020 and September 2024 Bosch exported roughly $72.4 million worth of micro-electro-mechanical-systems (MEMS) sensor products and automotive software to Huawei Technologies and its Entity List affiliates without the required licenses, with the items captured by the Foreign Direct Product Rule. Bosch agreed to pay a civil penalty of $36,184,680 and filed a voluntary self-disclosure, which BIS credited.
The Bosch resolution — one of a string of large 2026 BIS settlements — signals that the foreign direct product rule remains a live enforcement priority for shipments to Huawei, and that voluntary self-disclosure continues to materially reduce penalties. Multinationals with semiconductor-adjacent product lines should read the case as confirmation that BIS expects rigorous Entity List screening even for foreign-manufactured goods with U.S. technology content.
7. New Section 232 metals-tariff adjustments
The White House also reshaped the trade-enforcement landscape this month. In a June 1 proclamation, summarized in an accompanying fact sheet, President Trump adjusted Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper. The order lowers duties on agricultural equipment such as combines and harvesters from 25 percent to 15 percent, extends the 15 percent industrial-equipment category to mobile machinery like bulldozers and forklifts imported from trade-deal partners, and offers a 10 percent rate for capital equipment containing at least 85 percent U.S.-melted steel or aluminum by weight. The changes are temporary, running through December 31, 2027.
The administration frames the adjustments as a tool to spur domestic investment, noting U.S. steelmaking capacity expansions in West Virginia, Arkansas, and South Carolina and new aluminum and copper projects. For importers, the practical effect is a more granular tariff schedule that rewards domestic-content sourcing — a structure that will require careful product-by-product classification to capture the lower rates.
8. OFAC opens a new delisting “Reconsideration Portal”
Finally, on June 29 OFAC launched an online Reconsideration Portal for parties seeking removal from a sanctions list. The agency says the portal is meant to streamline petitions by gathering necessary information upfront rather than through repeated questionnaire exchanges, and it allows listed persons to request certain unclassified, non-privileged “courtesy” material underlying their designation. OFAC updated its guidance, revised FAQ 897, added a new FAQ 1261, and published quick-reference guides, signaling that it intends to transition away from email submissions over time.
The procedural reform is significant for due-process reasons often overlooked in sanctions coverage: designation carries severe financial consequences, and a faster, more transparent delisting mechanism gives affected parties — including any wrongly identified entities — a clearer path to relief. It also responds to long-running criticism, including from compliance practitioners, that the petition process has been slow and opaque.
What warrants deeper TIJ investigation
Several threads from this week merit follow-up reporting. First, the Prince Group network’s eleven U.K. shell companies raise questions about how a transnational scam syndicate built and maintained a corporate footprint in London; British company-registry records may reveal additional facilitators. Second, the designation of a licensed Cambodian bank and a major Cuban commercial bank invites scrutiny of which correspondent institutions and payment processors maintained relationships up to the listing date. Third, the appearance of an Indian explosives manufacturer in the Sudan action points to a commercial-chemicals supply chain that may extend to other conflict zones. Finally, the new Reconsideration Portal will generate a public record of delisting outcomes worth tracking, as patterns in who is removed — and how quickly — will test the transparency the administration says it is delivering. TIJ will continue to monitor these networks as corporate filings, court records, and future OFAC actions come to light.
This digest is based on public records published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and the White House. Sanctions designations are administrative actions and do not constitute criminal findings of guilt. Parties named may contest their listings through OFAC’s petition process.