Global Corruption Watch is The Investigative Journal’s weekly review of international anti-corruption enforcement, money-laundering cases, and the kleptocratic networks that move illicit wealth across borders. Every claim below is tied to a public record; allegations are distinguished from findings, and pending matters are flagged as such.
The last full week of June 2026 closed a consequential month for the global accountability apparatus. A former European head of state was referred for possible criminal prosecution over “golden passports” sold to Russian oligarchs. The Financial Action Task Force reshuffled its money-laundering watch list and handed its presidency to the United Kingdom. Prosecutors in Brussels confirmed a half-billion-euro money-laundering inquiry into one of Europe’s best-known fintech firms. And new cross-border research documented why the financial-intelligence units meant to catch dirty money so often cannot. Here are the developments that matter.
1. Cyprus: former president referred for criminal charges over Russian ‘golden passports’
Cyprus’ Independent Authority Against Corruption has identified seven suspected criminal offenses connected to former President Nicos Anastasiades, including at least one felony, according to reporting published June 17 by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and its Cyprus partner CIReN. The authority’s findings allege three counts of trading in influence and four counts related to abuse of power, and conclude that Anastasiades used his position to fast-track “golden passport” citizenships for Russian oligarchs Alexander Abramov and Leonid Lebedev. Anastasiades has denied all wrongdoing, describing the report as a politically motivated “smear campaign,” and previously filed defamation suits against the journalist whose reporting triggered the inquiry.
The probe also names Anastasiades’ former law firm, Nicos Chr. Anastasiades & Partners, and two managing partners, who face allegations of trading in influence. One partner is alleged to have committed perjury by testifying that Lebedev held no assets in Cyprus while, records cited by the authority indicate, personally managing a trust worth roughly 17 million euros ($18.2 million) for him. Some of the authority’s findings draw on OCCRP’s 2019 Troika Laundromat investigation, which linked the firm to the movement of money through offshore shell companies. The felony referral relates to the 2013 collapse of Laiki Bank, once the island’s second-largest lender.
Two structural cautions apply. First, the anti-corruption authority can only recommend charges; it cannot prosecute. Its file was forwarded to the Legal Service, and both the attorney general and deputy attorney general — each appointed by Anastasiades — have recused themselves, leaving the question of indictment unresolved. Second, these are allegations and recommendations, not convictions. Still, the case is significant precisely because it targets the residency-by-investment and citizenship-by-investment schemes that watchdogs have long flagged as conduits for sanctioned wealth — and because it reaches a former EU head of government. It is a lead TIJ will track as the prosecutorial decision unfolds.
2. FATF adds Bosnia and Iraq to grey list, hands presidency to the UK
The Financial Action Task Force concluded its Paris plenary on June 19, and the official outcomes statement confirms two additions to the “grey list” of jurisdictions under increased monitoring — Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq — while Algeria and Namibia were removed after successful on-site visits. Twenty-two jurisdictions now remain under increased monitoring; the “black list” subject to a call for action was unchanged. Grey-listing is consequential: it typically raises correspondent-banking friction and compliance costs for the listed economy until agreed action plans are completed.
The plenary also marked a leadership transition. The FATF presidency passed from Mexico to the United Kingdom for the 2026–2028 term under incoming President Giles Thomson, whose stated priorities are combating the global fraud epidemic — including the money-laundering risks from Southeast Asian “scam compounds” — strengthening the risk-based approach, and improving public-private information sharing. Members approved a public consultation on cross-border payment transparency under the strengthened Recommendation 16, adopted mutual evaluations of Canada and Türkiye for publication later in 2026, and appointed India’s Vivek Aggarwal as vice-president. The FATF’s suspension of the Russian Federation, in place since 2023, continues.
3. Belgian prosecutors probe Wise over half a billion euros in suspicious transactions
The digital money-transfer firm Wise is under investigation by prosecutors in Belgium over concerns its accounts were used to launder the proceeds of fraud, corruption, and drug trafficking, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported as part of the “Dirty Payments” project coordinated by the network European Investigative Collaborations. Prosecutors opened the inquiry after Wise accounts featured in hundreds of cross-border judicial requests from more than 30 countries, involving transactions the reporting puts at roughly half a billion euros. Investigators say they are examining “indications of non-compliance with anti-money laundering legislation.”
Wise, which is dual-listed in the US and UK and valued at around £10 billion, said its Belgian office handles law-enforcement requests across the European Economic Area, that roughly a third of its staff is dedicated to fighting financial crime, and that it is cooperating with the Brussels prosecutor. The investigation concerns Wise’s European operations rather than its UK customer base, and no findings of wrongdoing have been made. The case nonetheless sharpens scrutiny of electronic-money institutions: the UK Treasury’s most recent national risk assessment raised the sector’s money-laundering threat rating to “high,” and Wise’s US subsidiary was separately fined $4.2 million last year over Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering violations.
4. FCPA conviction heads to sentencing as US foreign-bribery enforcement continues
A federal jury in Pennsylvania convicted Charles Hunter Hobson, a former US coal-company executive, of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, along with conspiracy, money laundering, and wire-fraud counts, over a scheme to pay bribes through a third party to win business with a state-run company in Egypt. According to an analysis by law firm Arnold & Porter summarizing the Department of Justice announcement, Hobson was scheduled to be sentenced on June 25 and faces maximum penalties of five years on each FCPA count and up to 20 years on the money-laundering and wire-fraud conspiracy counts.
The case is instructive on the current state of US anti-bribery enforcement. Proceedings were briefly paused after a February 2025 executive order that suspended most FCPA enforcement, but the Justice Department cleared the matter to proceed in April 2025 and secured the conviction at trial. Consistent with revised DOJ guidelines that emphasize individual over corporate liability, prosecutors charged Hobson personally while his former employer, Corsa Coal Corporation, received a formal declination crediting its voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation. The outcome indicates that, whatever the shift in enforcement priorities toward cartels and transnational criminal organizations, the FCPA remains an active tool against individuals who bribe foreign officials.
5. Transparency International: financial-intelligence units under-powered and under-protected
New research from Transparency International, published June 24, finds that financial-intelligence units (FIUs) — the national bodies that receive suspicious-transaction reports and are meant to be a first line of defense against dirty money — are frequently prevented from doing their job. The study, “Connecting the Dots,” examined FIUs across 20 countries and concludes that gaps in data access, legal powers, independence, and resources routinely blunt their effectiveness. In 12 countries, the report says, the legal frameworks governing appointment and dismissal of FIU leadership contain gaps that may compromise operational independence.
Crucially for the beneficial-ownership debate, Transparency International found that many FIUs lack direct access to essential data — including beneficial-ownership registries, tax records, and law-enforcement databases — limiting their ability to trace corrupt flows. The organization’s recommendation is blunt: governments should give FIUs the data access, clear legal powers, protection from political pressure, and adequate funding needed to function, and should deepen cooperation with prosecutors, supervisors, and foreign counterparts. The findings provide an empirical backdrop to the policy fights over corporate transparency now playing out in Washington and elsewhere.
6. Beneficial ownership in flux as US committee backs rollback for domestic firms
The United States’ beneficial-ownership regime remains unsettled. As the Journal of Accountancy reported, the House Financial Services Committee voted 26–25 to advance H.R. 425, the Repealing Big Brother Overreach Act, introduced by Rep. Warren Davidson, R-Ohio, with 193 co-sponsors. The bill would codify Treasury’s March 2025 interim rule removing beneficial-ownership reporting requirements for domestically formed companies under the Corporate Transparency Act, and would direct the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to delete information already collected on domestic entities and owners. To become law it would still need the full House and 60 votes in the Senate.
The measure reflects a genuine policy disagreement worth presenting on its own terms. Supporters, including Davidson, argue the reporting regime imposes a disproportionate compliance burden on small businesses and constitutes government overreach. Opponents, including Rep. Stephen Lynch, D-Mass., counter that beneficial-ownership disclosure is designed to strip anonymity from the shell companies that cartels, traffickers, fraudsters, and some oligarchs use to move illicit funds. The legal terrain is also shifting: in December 2025, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Corporate Transparency Act is constitutional. As amended by the bill, the law would still apply to foreign-owned entities registered to do business in the US — leaving open questions about coverage that anti-money-laundering practitioners will watch closely.
7. Treasury trims the sanctions list in a ‘modernization’ drive
The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control removed 76 entries from its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list as the opening step of what the department calls a sanctions-modernization initiative, according to a Treasury announcement. The removed entries, Treasury said, included deceased individuals, decommissioned vessels, defunct illicit-finance networks, and persons designated more than a decade ago who lack sufficient identifiers for screening. OFAC said each removal went through interagency vetting to ensure it would not harm US foreign-policy or national-security interests.
Treasury framed the effort as a matter of focus rather than retreat, noting that annual new sanctions listings rose from 880 in 2017 to more than 3,000 in 2024 and that firms expend significant resources screening low-risk matches. The stated goal is to concentrate on high-risk, sophisticated evasion schemes. Compliance specialists and transparency advocates will nonetheless watch the process closely to confirm that genuinely illicit actors are not swept off the list alongside stale entries; the same week’s OFAC activity included fresh Sudan- and Democratic Republic of the Congo-related designations, a reminder that the underlying enforcement machinery remains in motion. How “modernization” is measured — by effect rather than list length, as Treasury argues, or by the number of active designations, as some critics prefer — will shape the debate ahead.
Leads worth watching
Several threads from this week warrant deeper TIJ investigation. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported on June 6 on how European jurisdictions allegedly sheltered the assets of Rifaat al-Assad, an alleged war criminal — a case that sits squarely at the intersection of kleptocracy, enablers, and asset recovery. Its June 30 report on a crypto executive’s access to Westminster raises questions about how digital-asset money flows intersect with political influence. And the long tail of the 1MDB scandal and the US Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative remains live, with legislative proposals floated earlier in 2026 to expand forfeiture tools and route recovered kleptocrat wealth toward remediation. Each is a network story rather than a single-actor story — the kind this column exists to follow.
Editor’s note: This digest summarizes reporting and public records from OCCRP, the FATF, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the US Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury, Transparency International, and independent legal and trade analysis. Individuals and entities named in pending matters are presumed innocent; where subjects have denied allegations or responded, those responses are noted. Corrections and rights-of-reply requests can be directed to the editors.