The Investigative Journal’s Weekly Fact-Check Spotlight examines specific, checkable claims made in public over the past week and tests each one against primary sources — government databases, official records, and original research — rather than against the conclusions of other fact-checkers. This week we look at five claims spanning crime, health care, energy taxes, tariffs, and wages, drawn from figures on both the right and the left. A note on methodology appears at the end.
Claim 1: 2025 saw “the single largest decrease in violent crime and murder since 1937”
The claim. FBI Director Kash Patel, announcing the bureau’s preliminary 2025 figures, said the data show “the single largest decrease in violent crime and murder since 1937.” The administration and allied commentators have cited the numbers as evidence that public-safety policy is working.
The evidence. On May 13, 2026, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program released its First Look: 2025 Crime Data on the Crime Data Explorer. Drawing on submissions from more than 17,000 law-enforcement agencies covering about 96 percent of the population, the bureau estimated that violent crime fell 9.3 percent from 2024 to 2025. Within that total, murder and non-negligent manslaughter dropped an estimated 18.1 percent, robbery 18.5 percent, rape 7.6 percent, and aggravated assault 7.2 percent; property crime declined 12.4 percent.
Context that matters. The FBI itself labels the release “preliminary” and “subject to change” before the final annual report, expected later this year. Bureau crime estimates are routinely revised upward or downward as additional agencies report; in a well-documented earlier instance, the FBI’s 2022 figures were later revised so that an initially reported national decline became a slight increase. Records also show that House Oversight Committee Chairman James Comer has formally questioned the transparency of the bureau’s revision process — a caution that comes from the same side of the aisle as the officials touting the decline.
Verdict: Accurate, with caveats. Federal data do show a large 2025 decline in violent crime and murder, and the drop is real in the primary numbers. The specific “largest since 1937” superlative, however, rests on preliminary estimates that the FBI cautions could change, so it should be read as a characterization of provisional data rather than a settled historical record.
Claim 2: The 2025 reconciliation law cuts “nearly $1 trillion” from Medicaid and will strip coverage from millions
The claim. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer and other Democrats have said the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21, signed July 4, 2025) enacts “nearly $1 trillion” in Medicaid cuts and will cause millions to lose health coverage. Some Democratic figures have put the coverage loss as high as 15 million to 17 million.
The evidence. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office is the primary authority here. CBO’s cost estimates indicate the law reduces federal spending on Medicaid and CHIP by roughly $900 billion to just over $1 trillion across 2025–2034, with the largest single pieces coming from new work-reporting requirements, limits on state provider taxes, and restrictions on state-directed payments. On coverage, CBO’s June 24, 2025 analysis found that the Medicaid provisions alone would increase the number of people without insurance by 7.8 million in 2034. CBO’s broader estimate for the legislation puts the increase at roughly 10 million uninsured by 2034 (see also CBO’s estimated budgetary effects).
Context that matters. The higher figures — 15 million to 17 million — generally combine the law’s own provisions with the separate scheduled expiration of enhanced Affordable Care Act premium subsidies, which is a distinct policy not contained in this statute. Distinguishing the two matters for accuracy.
Verdict: Accurate on the core numbers; some larger figures need context. The “nearly $1 trillion” Medicaid figure is well-supported by CBO, and a coverage loss in the millions (about 10 million by 2034) is the office’s own projection. Claims at the top of the cited range, however, fold in a separate subsidy expiration and overstate what this law alone does.
Claim 3: California’s gas tax rose to 63.4 cents a gallon on July 1 — “the highest in the nation”
The claim. California Assemblyman Carl DeMaio said in a June 29 statement that the state’s gas tax climbed to 63.4 cents per gallon on July 1, calling it “the highest in the nation” and blaming the automatic annual increase written into state law.
The evidence. The California Department of Tax and Fee Administration confirms that the state’s motor-vehicle-fuel (gasoline) excise tax increased from 61.2 cents to 63.4 cents per gallon effective July 1, 2026, under the inflation-indexing mechanism established by Senate Bill 1. At 63.4 cents, California’s excise is the highest state gasoline excise tax in the country; the next-highest, Pennsylvania’s, sits below 60 cents.
Context that matters. “Highest in the nation” is precise for the state excise tax specifically. When every state levy is stacked together — excise, state sales tax applied to fuel, and low-carbon and cap-and-trade compliance costs passed to distributors — total per-gallon tax burdens are calculated differently by different analysts, and states such as Illinois come close on a combined basis. On the excise line that DeMaio referenced, however, California stands alone at the top.
Verdict: Accurate. The 63.4-cent figure and its effective date are confirmed by the state’s own tax agency, and it is the nation’s highest state gasoline excise tax.
Claim 4: The administration’s tariffs are paid by foreign countries and are not driving inflation
The claim. The administration has repeatedly maintained that its tariffs are borne by foreign exporters rather than Americans and are not a meaningful source of inflation.
The evidence. Research from within the Federal Reserve System points the other way. A Federal Reserve Board staff FEDS Note (April 8, 2026) estimated that tariffs raised core goods prices by roughly 3.1 percent cumulatively, accounting for essentially all of the excess goods inflation relative to pre-pandemic trends. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas found (May 5, 2026) that the realized tariff rate rose from 2.3 percent in 2024 to 10.9 percent by October 2025, and that tariff collections added about 0.80 percentage point to 12-month core PCE inflation as of March 2026 — meaning core inflation would have been about 2.3 percent absent the tariff effect. Economists at the New York Fed, in analyses published in February and again on July 8, 2026, concluded that U.S. importers and consumers — not foreign exporters — are bearing the large majority of the cost, with additional price pass-through still to come.
Context that matters. Two points cut in the administration’s favor. First, economists describe much of the tariff effect as a one-time increase in the price level rather than a permanent rise in the inflation rate, and headline CPI actually fell 0.4 percent in June 2026 as energy prices dropped (BLS). Second, the tariff landscape is itself in flux: on February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize tariffs, after which the administration replaced many of the struck-down levies with a temporary surcharge under separate authority.
Verdict: Contradicted by federal data. The proposition that Americans pay little or nothing for the tariffs is not supported by the Federal Reserve’s own research, which finds that domestic firms and consumers have absorbed most of the cost and that the levies measurably raised goods prices. Reasonable analysts differ on how lasting the inflation effect will be, but “no inflation, paid by foreigners” is not consistent with the primary evidence.
Claim 5: “Annual inflation has kept real wages from growing for the third consecutive month”
The claim. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, ranking member of the Senate Banking Committee, said in a statement after the June data that “inflation continues to be too high” and that “annual inflation has kept real wages from growing for the third consecutive month.”
The evidence. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Real Earnings report for June 2026 shows real average hourly earnings down 0.1 percent over the 12 months ending in June — essentially flat — while real average weekly earnings rose 0.3 percent over the same period as the average workweek lengthened. Consumer prices were up 3.5 percent over the year (BLS CPI).
Context that matters. The most recent month cuts against the “not growing” framing: real average hourly earnings actually rose 0.8 percent in June alone, because the Consumer Price Index fell 0.4 percent that month. In other words, real wages have been broadly stagnant over the past year on the hourly measure, but the latest reading showed them rising as inflation cooled.
Verdict: Mostly accurate, but incomplete. Warren is on solid ground that real hourly wages have been essentially flat over the past year. The claim understates the most recent data, however: real weekly earnings edged up over the year, and June specifically delivered a real-wage gain as prices fell.
How TIJ conducts fact-checks
The Investigative Journal selects claims that are specific, recent, and verifiable, and that are drawn from across the political spectrum. For each one, we locate the original statement and its context, then test it against primary sources — the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Congressional Budget Office, the FBI, the Federal Reserve, state tax agencies, court opinions, and official research — rather than relying on other outlets’ conclusions. We distinguish findings from allegations, flag when data are preliminary, contested, or subject to revision, and link every underlying source so readers can check our work themselves. Where a public figure disputes our reading of the record, we note the disagreement and welcome documented corrections. Our aim is neither to defend nor to indict, but to let the primary record speak.