Sanctions Watch is The Investigative Journal’s weekly digest of U.S. sanctions, export-control, and trade-enforcement activity, drawn from primary government records. This edition covers actions posted through July 20, 2026.
The week’s enforcement calendar was dominated by Iran. With the administration having notified Congress that U.S. military strikes on Iran had resumed, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) accelerated a designation campaign against the networks that move Iranian oil and procure weapons for Tehran. At the same time, the Justice Department marked a milestone in tariff and customs enforcement, and the Commerce Department moved in the opposite direction on the Persian Gulf’s other shore, easing export controls on the United Arab Emirates. Here are the eight actions that mattered most.
1. Treasury expands sanctions on Shamkhani oil-shipping network
On July 14, OFAC designated more than 50 individuals, companies, and vessels tied to the shipping network of Iranian businessman Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, according to a Treasury press release and the corresponding OFAC Recent Actions notice. Treasury says the network spans the UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, and other jurisdictions, and that it facilitates Iranian oil exports the government uses to fund the regime.
The action builds on designations OFAC issued in April 2026 and July 2025. Treasury records now indicate that more than 200 individuals, entities, and vessels have been sanctioned in connection with the Shamkhani network. The State Department published a parallel fact sheet describing the network’s reach into containerized shipping and commodities trading.
For compliance teams, the significance lies in the network’s use of third-country corporate layers. Filings indicate exposure for shipping registries, maritime insurers, and commodity traders operating across the Gulf and Southeast Asia, where the designated entities are domiciled. OFAC’s 50-percent rule extends blocking to entities the designated parties own, widening the diligence burden across the affected supply chains.
2. OFAC targets an IRGC weapons-procurement network
One day later, on July 15, OFAC sanctioned seven individuals and entities it alleges support an international weapons-procurement network operating on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), per Treasury’s announcement and the non-proliferation and counter-terrorism designations notice. The designations were issued under Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters.
The action extends procurement-focused designations OFAC made in May and June 2026 against networks that records indicate sourced weapons components for the IRGC and Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation. The designations reach across multiple jurisdictions, a pattern consistent with Treasury’s stated focus on the cross-border intermediaries that supply dual-use components.
3. U.S. and U.K. jointly sanction ransomware enablers
On July 13, OFAC designated two individuals and one entity for allegedly enabling ransomware operators and other cybercriminals, according to a Treasury release. Treasury says one individual and the entity provided virtual private network services used by ransomware groups, while the second individual sold tools to disguise ransomware and malware.
The designations were coordinated with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and issued under Executive Order 14390, which directs U.S. agencies to counter foreign cybercrime targeting Americans. The action reflects a continued pattern of transatlantic coordination on cyber sanctions and signals ongoing exposure for hosting providers and anonymization services whose customer base includes sanctioned actors.
4. State and Treasury tighten the screws on Cuba
Also on July 13, the State Department designated ten entities as part of what it described as a broader campaign against the Cuban government, according to OFAC’s Recent Actions notice. Four were designated for alleged roles in repression; six are state-owned enterprises, including the foreign-trade conglomerate GECOMEX and the maritime-port group GEMAR.
OFAC issued FAQ 1262, stating that non-U.S. persons generally will not be targeted for winding down dealings with GECOMEX, GEMAR, or their majority-owned subsidiaries through August 12, 2026. The guidance warns, however, that transferring blocked assets could carry significant sanctions risk. U.S. persons remain barred from dealing with the entities absent authorization, a constraint that primarily affects shipping, logistics, and trade-finance counterparties with Cuban exposure.
5. OFAC unwinds Hong Kong-era designations
In a rare de-escalation, OFAC on July 17 removed nine persons from the Specially Designated Nationals list after the national emergency declared under Executive Order 13936 — the 2020 “Hong Kong Normalization” order — expired. OFAC also moved 39 individuals from the SDN list to its Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions list under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, among them former Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Chief Executive John Lee, and Police Commissioner Chris Tang.
The reclassification eases the most restrictive blocking measures on those officials while retaining menu-based authorities. Reporting by NPR indicated Beijing welcomed the move amid broader trade discussions. For financial institutions, the change narrows — but does not eliminate — the compliance perimeter around senior Hong Kong officials. Separately, OFAC posted Russia-related designation updates on July 20 as part of routine list maintenance.
6. Commerce eases export controls on the UAE — including AI chips
Moving in the opposite direction from the week’s Iran designations, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced on July 10 that it will upgrade the UAE’s status under the Export Administration Regulations. BIS said it will remove the UAE from Country Groups D:3 and D:4 and reclassify it as Country Group A:5, citing the country’s designation as a Major Defense Partner and its support for U.S. objectives, including “Operation Epic Fury.”
The reclassification opens license-free exports under License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization for certain military items, satellites, and dual-use goods. Consistent with the U.S.–UAE Artificial Intelligence Cooperation framework signed in May 2025, BIS said it is also approving license-free receipt of advanced computing items — including AI chips and servers — by the UAE government and approved companies. The changes are implemented through a Federal Register notice.
The move is consequential for semiconductor and AI-hardware exporters, which gain a streamlined path to a major Gulf market. It also reverses restrictions tightened in prior years amid concern about technology diversion to third countries. BIS framed the easing as contingent on the UAE’s commitments to prevent diversion and to make matching investments in U.S. AI infrastructure — commitments whose enforcement will merit scrutiny.
7. Senate advances the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026
On the legislative front, a revised version of the Sanctioning Russia Act — the sweeping sanctions-and-tariff bill catalogued as S.1241 in the 119th Congress — was introduced in the Senate on July 14, following a bipartisan agreement with the administration announced by Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Roger Wicker, Lindsey Graham, and Richard Blumenthal. The measure remains pending legislation, not enacted law.
The revised bill reworks its secondary-tariff mechanism, authorizing tariffs of up to 100 percent on countries that continue new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas and rank among the five largest importers of those products, with a limited exception for buyers reducing their reliance. It would also codify mandatory sanctions on senior Russian officials, major banks, and the shadow tanker fleet, while granting the president broad waiver authority subject to a national-interest certification. Sponsors have expressed optimism about Senate passage this summer, though House support for the expanded tariff authority remains uncertain.
8. DOJ’s trade-fraud task force tops $1 billion
In the week’s marquee trade-enforcement development, the Justice Department announced that its Trade Fraud Task Force has surpassed $1 billion in recoveries and charged losses in less than a year. Established in August 2025, the task force investigates false declarations to Customs and Border Protection — including misclassification, transshipment, and false country-of-origin claims — used to evade Section 301 tariffs and antidumping and countervailing duties.
According to the department, CBP has assessed more than $2.1 billion in commercial trade penalties in fiscal 2026 and debarred 35 entities. DOJ cited a $549.5 million False Claims Act settlement announced in May 2026 with Perfectus Aluminum over an alleged scheme to evade duties on aluminum extrusions, and said it has stood up a dedicated litigating section for customs and trade matters. The department and the Department of Homeland Security also issued a resource guide for importers.
The milestone signals durable, escalating exposure for importers as tariff rates climb. Records indicate customs fraud is now being pursued through both civil False Claims Act actions — which reward whistleblowers — and criminal charges, raising the stakes for supply-chain diligence on origin and classification.
What warrants a closer look
Several threads from this week merit deeper reporting. The first is the geography of the Shamkhani network: Treasury’s own filings place designated entities in the UAE, Singapore, and Hong Kong even as the Commerce Department loosens controls on the UAE — a juxtaposition that invites scrutiny of how effectively diversion commitments can be policed in a jurisdiction that hosts both approved partners and sanctioned intermediaries. The AI-chip provisions of the UAE reclassification, in particular, warrant tracking against downstream end-use.
The second is the Sanctioning Russia Act’s secondary-tariff design. Its 100-percent tariff trigger and broad presidential waiver authority would give the executive branch wide discretion over major energy-importing economies; the mechanics of any waiver, and the criteria for a “national interest” certification, are worth watching as the bill moves. Finally, the trade-fraud task force’s reliance on the False Claims Act — and its whistleblower incentives — is likely to surface a pipeline of transshipment and country-of-origin cases that TIJ will continue to monitor.
Editor’s note: This digest summarizes public records published by the U.S. Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the State Department, and Congress. Designations are executive actions; individuals and entities named in them have the right to petition for removal, and inclusion on a sanctions list is not a criminal conviction. Pending legislation and civil settlements are identified as such. Sources are linked inline.